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THE PROBLEM OF THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT 




 The article discusses the problem of the indeterminate defendant in European tort law systems 
and in the projects aiming to unify tort law in Europe, such as Draft Common Frame of Reference 
and Principles of European Tort Law.  
 The given issue relates to a situation where there is a damage caused by one factor, yet upon 
available evidence one may indicate a few potential factors which might have led to the damage, 
but it cannot be ascertained which factor was the actual cause of it. The problem is addressed with 
reference to two scenarios. First, when there is a limited and known number of persons acting 
tortiously, each of whom potentially might have led to the damage, but only one of them had 
actually caused it. Second, when it is certain that one tortfeasor from the undetermined group  
of tortfeasors caused damage to some of the injured persons from the group of the injured persons, 
but it cannot be established precisely which tortfeasor caused damage to precisely which injured 
person.  
 In comparative law analysis, one may find various attempts to deal with the given issue, which 
come from the balance of ratios given to different solutions, as well as the legal possibilities  
or obstacles in national tort law systems. The main possibilities are: all-or-nothing approach, joint 
and several liability, and proportional liability. Those solutions are discussed in article in more 
detail with conclusion that the bold proposition of proportional liability presented in Principles  
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 Professors G. Calabresi and J.H. King once started their articles  
by noticing that those who are dealing with tort law will always, sooner  
or later, turn their thoughts to causation1. Causation is indeed the essence 
of civil liability or – paraphrasing philosophers2 – its cement. The first  
(or – according to some legal systems – the only) element of causal inquiry 
is the conditio sine qua non test, which in common law countries is called 
rather the but-for test. The test is made by asking whether the result would 
have happened, if the factor in question had not happened (in other words: 
but for the inquired factor). At first glance it might seem that the application 
of this test is relatively simple. The situation becomes complicated, 
however, when the causal relation is uncertain. There are a few issues that 
relate to uncertainty of causation, among which the problem of alternative 
causation3 (and within it – the problem of the indeterminate defendant)  
is one of the most important and controversial.  
 In general, the problem of the indeterminate defendant relates to  
a situation where there is indivisible damage caused by one factor, yet 
upon available evidence one may indicate a few potential factors which 
might have led to the damage and it cannot be ascertained which factor 
actually caused it4. The essence of the issue seems to be rather evidentiary 
(i.e. relating to procedural law) than concerning material law, but because 
of its inherent problem of the impossibility of proving the causal relation,  
it is commonly recognised as an issue of material law. There are a few 
issues in material civil law where the given problem is discussed, namely 
causation5, plurality of tortfeasors, and burden and standard of proof6.  
In this article the problem will be addressed from the causal point of view.  
                                                   
1  G. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr, 
University of Chicago Law Review 1975, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 69; J.H. King, Jr, Causation, Valuation 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences , 
Yale Law Journal 1981, vol. 90, no. 6, p. 1353 (with reference to article of G. Calabresi). 
2  See: J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, Oxford 1980. 
3  “Alternative causation” is sometimes also called “potential causation”. 
4  See: M. Infantino, E. Zervogianni (eds), Causation in European Tort Law, on file with the 
author, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017. 
5  See: B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort 
Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, pp. 353-455;  
E. Bagińska, Odpowiedzialność deliktowa w razie niepewności związku przyczynowego. Studium 
prawnoporównawcze [Tort Liability under Uncerainty and Complexity of Causation. A Comparative 
Law Study], Toruń 2013, pp. 113-228. 
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1. SCENARIOS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT  
 
 In modern comparative law projects7, the alternative causation issue is 
discussed with reference to various causal scenarios. The number of those 
scenarios differs. However one might distinguish between those which 
relate to uncertainty as to a defendant, and those relating to uncertainty  
as to an injured person. Another possible division is whether the group  
of potential causes is composed purely of tortfeasors, or whether there is 
also a factor for which no one bears liability (eg. natural event, non-tortious 
behaviour, or behaviour of a plaintiff). Scenarios might also be divided by 
the number of injured persons. Regardless of the many ways in which that 
hypothesis might be divided, in this article just two of them will be 
discussed. The analysis will not refer to cases where an alternative factor 
was of a kind for which no one bears liability, for example a natural event 
or events within the victim’s sphere. The discussion will also not refer  
to a scenario where the identities of all of the tortfeasors of an indivisible 
damage are known, but factual uncertainty relates to the extent of harm 
that may be attributed to each of them. 
 1.1. The first (classical) scenario concerning uncertainty as to a cause  
is that there is a limited and known number of persons acting tortiously, 
each of whom potentially might have led to indivisible damage, but only 
one of them had actually caused it. A typical example (coming from old 
Austrian8, French9 and US judgments10) is a hunting case: two hunters 
shooting in the same direction from the same-type weapon, but only one 
bullet hits the injured person. It cannot be ascertained from which weapon 
the bullet actually came. Relying on classical procedural rules, the 
plaintiff’s claim should be rejected, because he/she cannot establish who 
actually caused the damage, i.e. who is the actual tortfeasor, although the 
                                                                                                                           
6  See: S. Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law, Cambridge 2015, p. 139 et seq. 
7  See: Winiger, Koziol, Koch, Zimmermann (eds), supra note 5; J. Spier (ed.), Unification  
of Tort Law: Causation, The Hague-London-Boston 2000; Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4.  
8  E.g. Oberster Gerichtshof, 23.12.1908, Rv VI 308/8, JB1 1909, 81; Oberster Gerichtshof, 
23.05.1916, Rv II 314/16, JB1 1916, 477. 
9  2nd Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 13.03.1975, Bull. Civ. II, no. 88. 
10  Oliver v. Miles [1927] 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666, 50 A.L.R. 357. 
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plaintiff is able to sue all of the potential tortfeasors (who acted tortiously 
and who commonly created the risk of damage) and prove the damage.  
 1.2. The second scenario extends the number of injured persons. It is 
certain that one tortfeasor from the undetermined group of tortfeasors 
caused damage to some of the injured persons from the group of the 
injured persons, but it cannot be established precisely which tortfeasor 
caused damage to precisely which injured person. From the tortfeasor(s) 
point of view it is certain that he/she caused damage, but it is uncertain  
to which injured person (uncertainty on the side of the injured person).  
On the other hand, from the point of view of the injured person(s), it is 
certain that the damage was caused by one tortfeasor, but he/she cannot 
establish by which one (uncertainty on the side of a cause). An example 
that triggered the given scenario comes from a famous DES cases11:  
a pregnant women were taking medicines that included an ingredient DES 
(diethylstilbestrol). Medicines with DES were produced by many different 
pharmaceutical companies and were allowed in USA. Some of the girl-
children of those women (second generation) became sick with a cancer 
because of the DES. From a general point of view, it was certain that the 
medicine produced by many pharmaceutical companies caused cancer  
to many injured persons, however in each individual case it was impossible 
to prove that the plaintiff’s cancer was caused by medicine from  
a particular pharmaceutical company. It might be seen that from general 
point of view the scenario does not create the problem of alternative 
causation, because it is clear that each pharmaceutical company certainly 
caused damage. However, from an individual plaintiff’s point of view,  
the hypothesis is an alternative causation problem, for she cannot prove 
which tortfeasor from the group of tortfeasors caused her damage.  
From individual point of view this scenario is then similar to the first 






                                                   
11  See: Sindell v. Abbot Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (1980). 
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2. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ALTERNATIVE CAUSATION 
 
 As outlined at the outset, a commonly recognised prerequisite  
of liability is a causal link between a certain event and damage. The essence 
of an issue of alternative causation is that it does not fulfil the test of 
conditio sine qua non, or more precisely – it is uncertain whether between the 
tortfeasor’s actions or omissions and the damage this test is passed12. Since 
the burden of proof of causation lies on the plaintiff, he/she needs to 
undermine the defendant’s claim that without his/her conduct the damage 
would have happened, because another (alternative) event would have 
caused it. If the plaintiff is not able to prove the causation between 
defendant’s acts and damage, the later is relieved from liability. This 
outcome, however, does not always seem to be fair and just, and therefore, 
in comparative law analysis, one may find various attempts to deal with 
this problem. The differences between legal systems or the doctrinal 
disputes within them are so significant, that some authors humorously 
refer to the problem as “the jungle of alternative causation”13, which is 
actually quite true. Those differences come from the balance of ratios given 
to different solutions, as well as the legal possibilities or obstacles in certain 
tort law systems. Different approaches were also taken by two main 
projects on the unification of tort law, namely by the Principles  
of European Tort Law (PETL)14 and Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR)15. The main possibilities are: an all-or-nothing approach, joint and 
several liability, and proportional liability. All of them will be discussed 





                                                   
12  See: Winiger, Koziol, Koch, Zimmermann (eds), supra note 5, p. 4. 
13  Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
14  Project prepared by the European Group on Tort Law – see: European Group on Tort 
Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary, Wien 2005. 
15  Project prepared by Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group  
on EC Private Law (Acquis Group) – see Ch. von Bar, E. Clive, H. Schulte-Nölke, Principles, 
Definitions and model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) , 
Munich 2009. 
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 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
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presumed to have caused that damage” and according to Article VI - 6:105 
“Where several persons are liable for the same legally relevant damage, 
they are liable solidarily”. This approach is common to certain jurisdictions, 
where cases of alternative causation are solved by imputing joint and 
several liability on all potential tortfeasors. It is made either by a statutory 
provision, case-law19, or is reflected in doctrinal opinions.  
 In cases where all potential tortfeasors are known (scenario 1.1.) 
statutory provisions, for example in Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and 
Ireland in general impose joint and several liability. The statutory provision 
in England that imposes joint and several liability relates to the specific 
type of cases (mesothelioma disease).  
 German BGB in § 830(1)2 stipulates, “if several persons (mehrere) have 
caused injury through a jointly undertaken delict, each person is liable  
for the injury. The same applies where it cannot be established which  
of several participants (Beteiligten) has caused the injury by his act”20. Upon 
§ 840 BGB the liability of alternative tortfeasors is joint and several.  
The number of conditions for application of § 830(1)2 BGB differ in 
jurisdiction and doctrine21. S. Steel points to six of them:  
1. “It must be the case that more than one person has acted, each 
person independently of the other, in such a way that each person’s 
conduct increases the risk of injury to the claimant.  
2. Either (a) the risk-increasing conduct of only one such person was  
a cause of the claimant’s injury or (b) the risk-increasing conduct  
of some such persons caused the claimant’s damage.  
3. Each person’s conduct may have caused the entirety of the 
claimant’s damage.  
4. Either (a) it is not possible to determine which person(s) caused  
the damage or (b) it is not possible to determine the extent of the 
damage caused by each person.  
                                                   
19  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
20  Translation by Steel, supra note 6, p. 141. In original: „Haben mehrere durch eine 
gemeinschaftlich begangene unerlaubte Handlung einen Schaden verursacht, so ist jeder für den 
Schaden verantwortlich. Das Gleiche gilt, wenn sich nicht ermitteln lässt, wer von mehreren 
Beteiligten den Schaden durch seine Handlung verursacht hat“. 
21  Compare: Bundesgerichtshof, 22.06.1976, VI ZR 100/75. 
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5. Apart from proof of natural causation, the claimant has satisfied  
the other conditions of a cause of action against each person.  
6. The claimant must not be able to establish that any individual 
person, against whom it seeks to rely upon § 830 I 2 BGB, was  
a wrongful cause of its injury”22.  
 Similarly Article 6:99 of the Dutch Civil Code states that “Where  
the damage is caused by two or more events, for each of which another 
person is liable, and it is ascertained that the damage originates from  
at least one of these events, then each of these liable persons is joint and 
several liable for that damage, unless a liable person proves that this 
specific damage is not caused by the event for which he himself is liable”23. 
Also Article 926 sent. 2 of Greek Civil Code stipulates that “if damage  
is provoked by two or several authors and it cannot be ascertained  
which author’s action did in fact lead to the damage, all of them are held 
jointly liable”24. This provision stipulates the presumption that the act of  
a possible tortfeasor is causally linked with the damage. The presumption 
is rebuttable, which in consequence leads to the reversing of the burden of 
proof25. E. Dacoronia points to the following requirements for applicability 
of the given article: 
1. “Acts of more than one person. It is of no interest whether the acts 
were simultaneous or successive; if they were alike or not; if they 
were based on a prior agreement between the wrongdoers or not. 
2. Each one of the several persons’ act is required to be independently 
adequate to have caused the damage, i.e. is required to be regarded 
as a potential cause of the wrong complained of. Should one of the 
two or more possible tortfeasors prove the lack of adequate 
causation between his act and the damage, he is excluded from 
liability. 
                                                   
22  Steel, supra note 6, pp. 142-143. 
23  English translation of the Dutch Civil Code available at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/ 
legislation/dcctitle6611bb.htm [last accessed: 2.11.2016]. 
24  Provision of Article 926 sent. 2 as referred in: E. Dacoronia, Greece, [in:] B. Winiger,  
H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases 
on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, p. 362. 
25  Ibidem, p. 363. 
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3. Each one of the several persons’ act is required to be tortious based 
on fault i.e. it would give rise to liability could causation be proven. 
However, it is accepted that Article 926 GCC applies by analogy  
to strict liability also. 
4. It must be impossible to ascertain which particular action did in 
fact lead to the damage or the extent to which the damage was 
caused by each one of the tortfeasors”26. 
 Irish law takes in that regard a slightly different approach, by deeming 
tortfeasors concurrent wrongdoers. Sec. 11(3) of the Civil Liability Act 1961 
reads as follows: “Where two or more persons are at fault and one or more 
of them is or are responsible for damage while the other or others is or are 
free from causal responsibility, but it is not possible to establish which  
is the case, such two or more persons shall be deemed to be concurrent 
wrongdoers in respect of the damage”. Concurrent wrongdoers are defined 
in sec. 11(1) of the Act of 1961 as “two or more persons (…) when both or 
all are wrongdoers and are responsible to a third person (in this Part called 
the injured person or the plaintiff) for the same damage, whether or not 
judgment has been recovered against some or all of them”. According to 
sec. 12(1) of the Act 1961 “concurrent wrongdoers are each liable for the 
whole of the damage in respect of which they are concurrent wrongdoers”. 
 In England joint and several liability in an alternative causation context 
is established in legislation for a specific type of cases. Sec. 3 of the 
Compensation Act 2006 relates to mesothelioma work-related diseases.  
It is important to notice, that mesothelioma is a cancer usually caused  
by exposure to asbestos and even a single asbestos fibre might cause it. Due 
to the fact that mesothelioma symptoms may not appear until 30-50 years 
after asbestos exposure (leading to death in approx. 14 months) if the 
employee worked for a few employers who exposed him/her to asbestos, 
it is impossible to prove in which period of time the employee contracted 
the disease and in consequence – which employer should be held liable.  
It is then the typical case of alternative causation. In that regard, according 
sec. 3(1) of 2006 Act:  
                                                   
26  Ibidem, p. 363 and references to Greek literature thereof.  
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1. a person (“the responsible person”) has negligently or in breach  
of statutory duty caused or permitted another person (“the victim”) 
to be exposed to asbestos,  
2. the victim has contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure  
to asbestos,  
3. because of the nature of mesothelioma and the state of medical 
science, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether it 
was the exposure mentioned in paragraph (a) or another exposure 
which caused the victim to become ill, and  
4. the responsible person is liable in tort, by virtue of the exposure 
mentioned in paragraph (a), in connection with damage caused to 
the victim by the disease (whether by reason of having materially 
increased a risk or for any other reason).  
 According to sec. 3(2)(b) the responsible person shell be held liable 
jointly and severally with any other responsible person.  
 The abovementioned (revised27) sec. 3 Compensation Act 2006 was  
a legislative reaction to a judicial decisions concerning mesothelioma 
disease, which started from the famous Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral 
Services Ltd [2002]28 and more importantly Barker v. Corus UK Ltd [2006]29 
which established the proportional liability of employers in mesothelioma 
cases. It is however worth noticing, that the applicability of this section  
is restricted only to mesothelioma cases30 and in a recent judgment of  
the UK Supreme Court in International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance 
Plc UK [2015]31 it was explained that Compensation Act 2006 does not 
apply to certain jurisdictions (in this case: to Guernsey) then Barker  
remains a good law32. As their Lordships said “the Act left the common law 
intact but carved an exception out of it for mesothelioma”33 and that the  
                                                   
27  Sec. 3 Compensation Act 2006 has been changed by Contribution for Mesothelioma 
Claims Regulations 2006, Statutory Instrument 2006/3259. 
28  UKHL 22; [2003] 1 A.C. 32 (HL). 
29  UKHL 20; [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (HL). 
30  See: K. Oliphant, England, [in:] H. Koziol, B.C. Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 2006, 
Wien 2008, p. 154. 
31  UKSC 33; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 1471 (SC). 
32  See: J. Morgan, Reinterpreting the Reinterpretation of the Reinterpretation of Fairchild, 
Cambridge Law Journal 2015, vol. 74, no. 3, p. 397. 
33  Lord Sumption in International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance Plc UK [2015] UKSC 33; 
[2015] 2 W.L.R. 1471 (SC), para. 179. 
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“2006 Act was clearly passed to change a common law rule expounded  
in Barker (…). The United Kingdom Parliament’s reaction was its right,  
but does not alter the common law position apart from the statute, or have 
any necessary effect in jurisdictions where the common law position has 
not been statutorily modified”34.  
 Joint and several liability is established by case-law, for example  
in Austria, France and Poland35. In Austria it is done by the adoption  
of the concept that all individual actions created a single (combined) act.  
It is explained by stating that all the tortfeasors acted wrongfully  
and negligently, jointly creating a risky behaviour36. This joint behaviour 
constitutes therefore a conditio sine qua non of the damage and the defendants 
are jointly liable in analogy to § 1302 ABGB, unless the tortfeasor can prove 
that his/her behaviour was not the cause of the damage (reversed burden 
of proof)37.  
                                                   
34  Lord Mance in International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance Plc UK [2015] UKSC 33; 
[2015] 2 W.L.R. 1471 (SC), para. 27. 
35  See: case SN [Supreme Court] of 18.01.2012, I CSK 157/11, OSNC ZD 2013, item 30 
discussed in: E. Bagińska, I. Adrych-Brzezińska, Poland, [in:] E. Karner, B.C. Steininger (eds), 
European Tort Law 2013, Berlin/Boston 2014, pp. 497-499; Joint and several liability is also 
strongly supported by Polish doctrine – see: B. Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska, Wyrządzenie 
szkody przez kilka osób [Cause of Damage by Several Persons], Warszawa 1978, pp. 75-78;  
T. Dybowski, System Prawa Cywilnego [The System of Civil Law], Wrocław-Warszawa- 
Kraków-Gdańsk 1976, p. 264. In contrary (advocating for all-or-nothing approach) see:  
M. Kaliński, System Prawa Prywatnego. Prawo zobowiazań – część ogólna. Tom 6 [Private Law 
System. Obligation Law – General Part. Vol. 6], Warszawa 2012, pp. 137-138. 
36  See: Oberster Gerichtshof, 23.12.1908, Rv VI 308/8, JB1 1909, 81; Oberster Gerichtshof, 
23.05.1916, Rv II 314/16, JB1 1916, 477. It does not apply, however, when the causal 
connection between behaviour of one tortfeasor and entire damage is established and the 
causal connection between a second tortfeasor is uncertain – Oberster Gerichtshof, 22.04.1986, 
2 Ob. 12/86, JB1 1986, 787 – cases reference and commentary by B.A. Koch, Austria, [in:]  
B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: 
Essential Cases on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, pp. 359-361. 
37  § 1302 ABGB stipulates for joint and several liability of tortfeasors who contributed 
 to the harm. In original: „In einem solchen Falle verantwortet, wenn die Beschädigung in einem 
Versehen gegründet ist, und die Antheile sich bestimmen lassen, jeder nur den durch sein Versehen 
verursachten Schaden. Wenn aber der Schade vorsätzlich zugefügt worden ist; oder, wenn die Antheile 
der Einzelnen an der Beschädigung sich nicht bestimmen lassen, so haften Alle für Einen, und Einer 
für Alle; doch bleibt demjenigen, welcher den Schaden ersetzt hat, der Rückersatz gegen die Uebrigen 
vorbehalten”. 
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 In France the courts apply two different theories to hold defendants 
jointly and severally liable in cases of alternative causation38. The first  
is “collective custody” (garde collective/garde en commun)39. It is based  
on Article 1384 of French Civil Code which stipulates liability for things  
in one’s care (responsabilité du fait des choses). Referring to hunting cases,  
the court considers that a tortfeasor’s weapons produced a “single spray of 
bullets” of which hunters had “collective custody”. “In cases where each 
defendant’s act is connected with and inseparable from those committed by 
the other member(s) of the group, and it appears impossible to determine 
who exactly was the custodian (gardien) of the object(s) concerned, the 
courts have tended to categorise both (or all) of the defendants as gardiens 
and find them liable in solidum”40. If there is a geographical proximity 
between potential causes and damage then it creates a rebuttable 
presumption of custody for each defendant and the rebuttable presumption 
of causation. This presumption is held against each defendant, as if he/she 
was the sole custodian41.  
 The second theory in the French jurisdiction is based on Article 1382  
or 1383 of the French Civil Code which stipulates liability for one’s own 
actions (responsabilité du fait personnel) and the concept of joint action (action 
commune). Among others, it applies in cases of a gang’s crimes42 and for 
admission there needs to be established a presumption of intention 
(presumption of shared will – volonté commune) and a rebuttable 
presumption of causation (that the tortfeasor participated – also indirectly – 
in an act that led to the damage)43. Similar attempts to solve the problem  
of alternative causation are sometimes seen in the Belgian jurisdiction.  
In the case where four boys were playing by throwing small stones to each 
other and where one of those stones hit the eye of a young boy (who was 
not taking part in this game) the court redefined the cause of damage  
by stating that the essential cause (la cause essentielle) was not an individual 
                                                   
38  See: O. Moréteau, C. Pellerin-Rugliano, France, [in:] B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch,  
R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases on Natural Causation, 
Wien-New York 2007, p. 364. 
39  E.g. 2nd Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, 13.03.1975, Bull.Civ. II, no. 88. 
40  Moréteau, Pellerin-Rugliano, supra note 38, p. 365 and literature cited thereof. 
41 Ibidem, pp. 364-365 and literature cited thereof. 
42  See e.g.: 2nd Civil Camber of the Cour de Cassation, 2.04.1997, Bull.Civ.II, no. 112. 
43  See: Moréteau, Pellerin-Rugliano, supra note 38, pp. 366-367 and literature cited thereof. 
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act of throwing stones, but the participation of all four boys in a dangerous 
game and held the boys and their parents jointly liable44. I. Durant rightly 
noticed, that this way of reasoning by the court is in fact a circumvention of 
the problem by a redefinition of misbehaviour45. It gives also a possibility 
of overcoming a requirement of “common fault” which includes a specific 
intentional element, which is sometimes used in cases of multiple 
tortfeasors46.  
 When it comes to the application of joint and several liability in 
scenario 1.2. the results in various legal systems differ47. It is excluded then 
in Germany, for § 830(1)2 is interpreted narrowly. It is explained either  
by stating that the plaintiff cannot prove that a concrete defendant actually 
exposed him to a “concrete danger”48 or by saying that § 830(1)2 applies  
if each defendant potentially caused the entire loss49 or – to put it 
differently – that it reflects “the individualistic approach (…), which does 
not take account of the «multi-dimensional» character of the loss in its 
totality”50. On the other hand, the DES daughters case (and similar 
environmental and riot cases51) succeed in the Netherlands relying upon 
Article 6:99 of Dutch Civil Code holding any manufacturer liable in full  
to the plaintiff52. 
 The main arguments used to justify the imposition of joint and several 
liability in scenario 1.1 are that: a) it alleviates the plaintiff’s difficulties 
(which are often impossible to overcome) in proving which tortfeasor 
                                                   
44  The case referred by I. Durant; idem, Belgium, [in:] B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch,  
R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases on Natural Causation, 
Wien-New York 2007, p. 369. 
45  Ibidem, p. 369. 
46  Ibidem. 
47  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
48  Ibidem. 
49  See: OLG Neustadt, 20.12.1957, 2 U 135/57 referred in R. Zimmermann, J. Kleinschmidt,  
Germany, [in:] B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort 
Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, p. 448. 
50  See: ibidem, p. 448 and literature quoted thereof. 
51  See: W.H. van Boom, I. Giesen, Netherlands, [in:] B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch,  
R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: Essential Cases on Natural Causation, 
Wien-New York 2007 p. 370. Enviromental case (contaminating water) is: Moerman/Bakker, 
HR 17.01.1997, NJ 1997, 230. Riot case (arson by different groups of hooligans) is:  
HR 31.01.2003, NJ 2003, 346. 
52  Hoge Raad, 9.10.1992, NJ 1994, 535. 
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actually caused the loss53; b) it would be inequitable (unfair) to leave the 
injured person without compensation in cases where he/she undoubtedly 
has a claim against one of the actors54 (equity argument); c) liability for the 
risk creation: all the wrongdoers commonly created a risky behaviour, 
which resulted in damage55. Therefore it would be fair to hold those actors 
jointly and severally liable, for the difficulty in proof comes from their own 
sphere and the risk of damage has been created by each of them56 (liability 
for the creation of risk). 
 On the other hand the restriction in imposition of joint and several 
liability in scenario 1.2. is explained by saying that joint and several liability 
“would lead to the absurd consequence that a potential tortfeasor may  
be liable for a multiple of the loss which he has possibly caused”57. 
 
 2.3.  PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 
 
 Proportional liability in the context of alternative causation is proposed 
in Article 3:103 of Principles of European Tort Law, which states that:  
“(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have 
been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one  
in fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent 
corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s 
damage. (2) If, in case of multiple victims, it remains uncertain whether  
a particular victim’s damage has been caused by an activity, while it is 
likely that it did not cause the damage of all victims, the activity  
is regarded as a cause of the damage suffered by all victims in proportion 
to the likelihood that it may have caused the damage of a particular 
                                                   
53  See: Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof, 22.04.1986, 2 Ob. 12/86, JB1 1986,787; the reasoning 
behind the Greek legislation – see: Dacoronia, supra note 24, p. 363. 
54  See: in German law: Bundesgerichtshof, 22.06.1976, VI ZR 100/75; in Greek law: 
Dacoronia, supra note 24, p. 363 and literature cited therof; in Ireland: E. Quill, Ireland, [in:]  
B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: 
Essential Cases on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, p. 380, footnote 107. 
55  See: Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof, 23.12.1908, Rv VI 308/8, JB1 1909, 81; Oberster 
Gerichtshof, 23.05.1916, Rv I 314/16, JB1 1916, 477; Belgian case of boys who threw small 
stones – presented by Durant, supra note 44, p. 369. 
56  Dacoronia, supra note 24, p. 363 and literature cited thereof.  
57  Zimmermann, Kleinschmidt, supra note 49, p. 448 and literature quoted thereof – in context 
of non-applicability of § 830(2)1 BGB. 
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victim”. Paragraph (1) refers to a classical hunting-case scenario. Each 
activity is then regarded as a cause in respect to the likelihood (probability) 
that it may have caused the damage, and the tortfeasor has to pay that 
corresponding share58. In a case where the number of all the potential 
tortfeasors is unknown (for example in mass torts cases), the defendants 
should identify the other (potential) tortfeasors, which are not yet before 
the court. If they fail to do that, the court may apportion the loss between 
the known defendants in accordance with the likelihood that they caused 
the damage59. In turn para. (2) refers to DES-cases scenario. The proposition 
presented in Principles of European Tort Law refers to the market share 
liability test (or in other cases – a similar yardstick to attribute the loss).  
In a case where there is no basis to establish market shares of several 
tortfeasors with small market-share, their shares are presumed to be equal 
(Article 3:105 PETL)60.  
 Legislature in various European countries does not usually follow  
the proportionate liability pattern as proposed by PETL. An exception 
might be found in § 2925(2) of the Czech Civil Code 2012 for a specific type 
of cases, namely abnormally hazardous activities. It reads that  
“If circumstances clearly indicate that the operation has significantly 
increased the risk of damage, although it can be legitimately linked to other 
possible causes, a court shall order the operator to provide compensation 
for the damage to the extent that corresponds to the probability of the 
damage having been caused by the operation”61. This rule is however 
regarded as exceptional, and its scope of application is narrow62. 
 Proportional liability successfully developed in English case-law 
according to work-related diseases. It started from the crucial (and 
controversial63) judgment Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002]64 
                                                   
58  European Group on Tort Law, supra note 14, p. 48. 
59  Ibidem, p. 49. 
60  Ibidem, p. 49. 
61  Translation in: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
62  See: ibidem. 
63  For example, according to K. Oliphant, “the decision represents a bold but justifiable 
response to the problem of the «indeterminate defendant»” – K. Oliphant, England, [in:]  
B. Winiger, H. Koziol, B.A. Koch, R. Zimmermann (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1: 
Essential Cases on Natural Causation, Wien-New York 2007, p. 379; K. Oliphant, England, [in:] 
H. Koziol, B.C. Steinninger (eds), European Tort Law 2002, Wien 2003, p. 146. In contrast,  
J. Thomson asked “Can there be better examples [than Fairchild and Barker – KKL] of hard 
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where three claimants had been unlawfully exposed to asbestos dust 
during their successive employment by several employers and contracted 
mesothelioma. It was scientifically not possible to establish whether the 
cancer resulted from exposure to a single asbestos fibre, a number of fibres 
or by cumulative exposure. Therefore the injury was an “indivisible” one, 
as it was impossible to determine in which employment period the cancer 
was triggered65. Importantly however, the uncertainty had to be scientific 
and not merely evidential66. The House of Lords ruled for the claimant  
and awarded compensation from the employers explaining (by majority 
opinion) that the tortfeasor’s breach of duty had materially contributed  
to an increased risk of injury (contracting mesothelioma). Lord Rodger 
specified that “It is therefore essential not just that the defendant’s conduct 
created a material risk of injury to a class of persons but that it actually 
created a material risk of injury to the claimant himself” and “that the 
defendant’s conduct must have been capable of causing the claimant’s 
injury”. Therefore “the claimant must prove that his injury was caused by 
the eventuation of the kind of risk created by the defendant’s wrongdoing 
(…). By contrast, the principle does not apply where the claimant has 
merely proved that his injury could have been caused by a number  
of different events, only one of which is the eventuation of the risk created 
by the defendant’s wrongful act or omission”. What is more, “the claimant 
                                                                                                                           
cases making bad law?” – J. Thomsom, Barker v. Corus: Fairchild Chickens Come Home to Roost, 
Edinburgh Law Review 2006, vol. 10, p. 426; similarily J. Morgan wrote that Fairchild “was  
a hard case that made bad law” – Morgan, supra note 32, p. 395. 
64  [2002] UKHL 22. 
65  See: M.A. Hogg, Re-Establishing Othodoxy in the Realm of Casuation, Edinburgh Law 
Review 2007, vol. 11, pp. 13-14. 
66  See: Bagińska, supra note 5, pp. 148-149. The question of scientific uncertainty in the 
mesothelioma case was under consideration in a later case Sienkiewicz v. Greif and Knowsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council v. Willmore [2011] UKSC 10. In the fact of this case there was 
proof upon statistical data that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma was in 85% probability caused  
by environmental exposure to asbestos (i.e. the factor for which no one bears liability) and 
not liable employee. Therefore on balance of probabilities upon the statistical proof it was 
established that defendant was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury. UK Supreme Court held 
nevertheless employer’s full liability. The Court claimed that defendant materially increased 
the risk of mesothelioma by 18%, which was not de minimis, but enough to establish a causal 
connection in this case. The statistical data was regarded as not decisive, so the prerequisite 
of “scientific uncerainty” was met. It was explained that statistical data are not adequate  
in mesothelioma cases, because it is an indivisible damage and does not depend on the 
magnitude of exposure to asbestos. 
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must prove that his injury was caused, if not by exactly the same agency  
as was involved in the defendant’s wrongdoing, at least by an agency that 
operated in substantially the same way”. Importantly, it was also said that 
the principle applies to situations where “the other possible source of the 
claimant’s injury is a similar wrongful act or omission of another person” 
or where “the other possible source of the injury is a similar, but lawful, act 
or omission of the same defendant”67. In the Fairchild judgment the House 
of Lords did not indicate whether liability should be joint and several or 
individual and about the extent to which each defendant was to indemnify 
the claimant for damage68. Proportional liability was established in a later 
case Barker v. Corus UK Ltd [2006]69, which is said to be “the most important 
development in British causal jurisprudence in the last twenty years”70.  
In these three joint cases concerning again mesothelioma cancer contracted 
by workers, the House of Lords held employers liable in proportion to the 
magnitude of the risk of injury to which workers were exposed71.  
The criteria upon which damages were to be apportioned were left for  
the parties. According to Lord Hoffmann, they should be apportioned 
according to the defendant’s contribution to the risk. He suggested that  
it might practically be: the time of exposure for which each defendant  
is responsible, the intensity of the exposure or the type of asbestos72.  
The House of Lords therefore reversed the Appellate Court decision 
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for the whole indivisible 
injury. According to the understanding of the concept of causation after  
the Fairchild case, in Durham v. BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012]73 the Supreme 
Court explained that Fairchild liability is for “causing mesothelioma”  
                                                   
67  Lord Rodger in Fairchild, para. 170. 
68  See: Bagińska, supra note 5, p. 148. However according to M.A. Hogg in Fairchild  
“the material increase in risk principle was to be utilised to find the two employers jointly 
and severally liable for such an indivisible injury (…)” – Bagińska, supra note 65, p. 15. 
69  UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (HL). 
70  Hogg, supra note 65, p. 15. 
71  See: ibidem, p. 16. According to a recent case International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich 
Insurance Plc UK [2015] UKSC 33; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 1471 (SC), when it comes to employer’s 
recovery from insurer who insured employer only for certain period of time during which he 
employed victim with asbestos exposure (6 out of 27 years) UKSC ruled (in majority) that 
insurer is liable in full (but can claim a contribution from other insurers), and not pro rata. 
72  Lord Hoffmann in Barker v. Corus, para. 48. 
73  UKSC 14; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 867 (SC). 
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and not for “increasing the risk of mesothelioma”, however it is  
an “unconventional”, “broad”, and “weak” meaning of causation. 
 It needs to be recalled here, that the Barker case prompted the UK 
legislator to enact a new regulation in sec. 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 
holding those liable for unlawful exposure to asbestos jointly and severally 
liable to the victim for his/her contracting mesothelioma. The application 
of those rules is however restricted first, only to mesothelioma cases 
(beyond them the rules of Fairchild/Barker are still applicable)74 and second, 
to territories to which the Compensation Act 2006 is in force75.  
 In contrast to the all-or-nothing approach, the arguments for holding 
defendants proportionally liable are explained in similar way to those 
already mentioned in favour of joint and several liability. It is then claimed 
that equity and policy reasons call for holding each defendant liable  
(even if the causal relation between exposure and disease has not been 
proved owing to scientific uncertainty) and is “heavily overweighed”  
by the injustice in not compensating a victim who has suffered from the 
materialisation of the risk at which each defendant wrongfully put 
him/her. As Lord Bingham in Fairchild explained: “such injustice as may  
be involved in imposing liability on a duty-breaking employer in these 
circumstances is heavily outweighed by the injustice of denying redress  
to a victim. Were the law otherwise, an employer exposing his employee  
to asbestos dust could obtain complete immunity against mesothelioma 
(but not asbestosis) claims by employing only those who had previously 
been exposed to excessive quantities of asbestos dust. Such a result would 
reflect no credit on the law”76. Referring to Lord Wilberforce’s opinion  
in McGhee [1973]77 it was cited that “the employers should be liable for  
an injury, squarely within the risk which they created and that they, not  
the pursuer, should suffer the consequence of the impossibility, foreseeably 
                                                   
74  See: Oliphant, supra note 30, p. 154. Lord Mance (para. 27) and Lord Sumption  
(para. 179) in International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance Plc UK [2015], UKSC 33. 
According to Lord Sumption “the Act left the common law intact, but carved an exception 
out of it for mesothelioma”. 
75  See: International Energy Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance Plc UK [2015], UKSC 33. 
76  Lord Bingham in Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32, 
para. 33. 
77  McGhee [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, para. 7. 
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inherent in the nature of his injury, of segregating the precise consequence 
of their default”. 
 Arguments for holding tortfeasors proportionately liable, instead  
of jointly and severally, were also presented extensively in comments  
on Principles of European Tort Law and by Lord Hoffmann in the Barker 
case.  
 In comments on Principles of European Tort Law the proportional 
liability approach was called “innovative”, therefore it needed to be well 
reasoned. The starting point seems to be a good balance between the 
victim’s and the liable person’s interests. According to the Group’s view,  
a tortfeasor should not be forced to compensate for a loss that was not 
caused by him, i.e. for the activity that does not even pass a condition sine 
qua non requirement78. On the other hand, it would be also inappropriate  
to leave the victim without compensation79. “The borderline between 
liability and non-liability is in many instances and cases rather a grey zone. 
(…) In that grey area, which probably covers a large number of day to day 
cases, the justification for establishing liability is almost as convincing  
as the opposite would have been. Moreover, coincidence (or bad luck), 
either on the side of the victim or of the tortfeasor, often play a considerable 
role. Seen from this angle, and depending on the merits of the case at hand, 
it might be counter-productive for the victim to opt for solidary liability. 
After all, if the court would take the view that solidary liability would be 
unfair in that specific case, it might feel reluctant to establish liability, as 
that would be the only feasible way to avoid the harshness of undesirable 
solidarity in that case”80.  
 In the circumstances of a particular case (Barker), those arguments are 
also reflected in Lord Hoffmann’s opinion. According to his Lordship, joint 
and several liability is legitimate when a defendant caused harm, so there  
is no reason to reduce liability because another tortfeasor participated  
in causing it. On the contrary, “when liability is exceptionally imposed 
because you may have caused harm, the same considerations do not apply 
and fairness suggests that if more than one person may have been 
                                                   
78  European Group on Tort Law, supra note 14, p. 46. 
79  Ibidem, p. 48. 
80 Ibidem, pp. 46-47. 
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responsible, liability should be divided according to the probability  
that one or other caused the harm”81. According to Lord Hoffmann  
the proportionate liability “would smooth the roughness of the justice 
which a rule of joint and several liability creates” and that wrongdoer 
“should not be liable for more than the damage which he caused and, since 
this is a case in which science can deal only in probabilities, the law should 
accept that position and attribute liability according to probabilities”. 
 
3. FINAL REMARKS  
 
 Neither of the three solutions to the problem of indeterminate 
defendant presented above is perfect. The all-or-nothing approach is hard 
and inevitably leads to an inequitable solution either on the side of a victim 
or of a potential tortfeasor. It was well observed, that the essence of this 
solution lies in standard and burden of proof in each jurisdiction82. 
Therefore the proper outcome seems to be the imposition of liability  
on possible tortfeasors. As stated above, in many countries a solution to  
the problem is found in the imposition of joint and several liability, which 
outcome is in fact a collective liability. The victim may be therefore 
naturally inclined to sue the tortfesor who is the most solvent. The bold 
proposition of proportional liability presented in Principles of European 
Tort Law seems to be then the better solution. Of course, there are certain 
threats, like that in scenario 1.2. it may urge the victim to start litigation 
against many defendants, however it is legitimate to claim that „it is 




                                                   
81  Lord Hoffmann in Barker v. Corus, para. 43. 
82  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
83  European Group on Tort Law, supra note 14, p. 50. 
 
 
